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Abstract. We show that symmetry transformations and caching can enable scal-
able, and possibly unbounded, verification of multi-agent systems. Symmetry
transformations map solutions and to other solutions. We show that this property
can be used to transform cached reachsets to compute new reachsets, for hybrid and
multi-agent models. We develop a notion of virtual system which define symmetry
transformations for a broad class of agent models that visit waypoint sequences.
Using this notion of virtual system, we present a prototype tool CacheReach
that builds a cache of reachtubes for this system, in a way that is agnostic of
the representation of the reachsets and the reachability analysis subroutine used.
Our experimental evaluation of CacheReach shows up to 66% savings in safety
verification computation time on multi-agent systems with 3-dimensional linear
and 4-dimensional nonlinear fixed-wing aircraft models following sequences of
waypoints. These savings and our theoretical results illustrate the potential benefits
of using symmetry-based caching in the safety verification of multi-agent systems.
1 Introduction
As the cornerstone for safety verification of dynamical and hybrid systems, reachability
analysis has attracted attention and has delivered automatic analysis of automotive,
aerospace, and medical applications [2,23,17,11]. Notable advances from the last few
years include the development of the generalized star data-structure [14] and the HyLaa
tool [3] that have massive linear models [4]; Taylor model based reachability analy-
sis algorithms for nonlinear systems and their implementations in Flow* [7]; and a
simulation-based algorithm that guarantees locally optimal precision [15].
Exact symbolic reachability analysis of nonlinear models is generally hard. One
prominent approach is based on generalizing individual behaviors or simulations to cover
a whole set of behaviors. The idea was pioneered in [10] and implemented in Breach [9]
with sound generalization guarantees for linear models based on sensitivity analysis.
Subsequently the idea has been extended to nonlinear, hybrid, and black-box systems
and implemented in tools like C2E2 and DryVR [12,19,17,16].
In all of the above, a single behavior ξ of the system from an initial state, is general-
ized to a compact set of neighboring behaviors that contains all the behaviors starting
from a small neighborhood around the initial state of ξ . Thus, the computed neighboring
set of behaviors always contains ξ and its size is determined by the algorithms for
sensitivity analysis. In contrast, the type of generalization we pursue here uses symmetry
transforms on the state space. Given a group Γ of operators on the state space, and a
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single behavior ξ , we can generalize it to γ(ξ ), for each γ ∈ Γ . The transformation can
be applied to sets of behaviors symbolically. Not only can this type of generalization
work in conjunction with sensitivity analysis, it captures structural properties of the
system that make its behavior similar for significantly different states that sensitivity
analysis would not capture.
In our recent work [26], we showed how this symmetry transforms can be used to
produce new reach sets from other previously computed reach sets for non-parameterized
dynamical systems. In this paper, we introduce the use of symmetry transforms of
parameterized dynamical systems in their safety verification. We present an algorithm
symComputeReachtube (Algorithm 1) which cache and reuse reach sets to generate
new ones, avoiding repeating expensive computations. We show how an infinite number
of reach sets can be obtained by transforming a single one using symmetry transforms
(Corollary 3). Building on it, we provide unbounded time safety guarantees using finite
cached safety checking results (Theorem 6).
The key contributions of this paper are as follows.
First, we show how symmetry transformations for parameterized dynamical systems
can be used to compute reachable states (Theorem 2). Going well beyond the previous
theory [26], this enables cached reach tubes to be reused for verification across different
modes and across multiple agents.
We develop a notion of virtual system (Section 4) which automatically define sym-
metry transformations for a broad swathe of hybrid and dynamical systems modeling
agents visiting a sequence of waypoints (see Theorem 3 and Examples 3 and 4). That
is, reachability analysis of a multi-agent system (with possibly different dynamics and
different parameters) can be performed in a common transformed virtual coordinate
system, and thus, increasing the possibility of reuse. We show how this principle can
make it possible to verify systems over unbounded time and with unbounded number of
agents (Theorem 6), provided we infer that no new unproven scenarios appear for the
virtual system.
We present a prototype implementation of a tool that uses symComputeReachtube.
We name it CacheReach. It builds a cache of reach tubes for the transformed virtual
system, from different sets of initial states. In performing reachability analysis of a
multi-agent hybrid or dynamical system, for each agent and each mode, it: 1. transforms
the initial set X to the virtual coordinates to get γ(X). 2. If the transformed set γ(X) has
already been stored in the cache, then it simply extracts the cached reach tube and γ−1
transforms it to get the actual reach set. 3. Otherwise, it computes the reach set from
γ(X) and caches it. Our algorithm symComputeReachtube and its implementation in
CacheReach are agnostic of the representation of the reach sets and the reachability
analysis subroutine, and therefore, any of the ever-improving libraries can be plugged-in
for step 3.
Our experimental evaluation of CacheReach shows safety verification computation
time savings of up to 66% on scenarios with multiple agents with 3d linear dynamics
and 4d fixed-wing aircraft nonlinear model following sequences of waypoints. These
savings illustrate the potential benefits of using symmetry transformation-based caching
in the safety verification of multi-agent systems.
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2 Model and problem statement
Notations. We denote by N, R, and R≥0 the sets of natural numbers, real numbers
and non-negative reals, respectively. Given a finite set S, its cardinality is denoted by
|S|. Given N ∈ N, we denote by [N] the set {1, . . . ,N}. Given a vector v ∈ Rn and
a set L ⊆ [n], we denote the projection of v to the indices in L by x[L]. We define
an n-dimensional hyper-rectangle by a 2d-array specifying its bottom-left and upper-
right vertices in Rn. We denote the projection of a hyperrectange H on the set of
dimensions L by H ↓L. Given a function γ : Rk → Rk and a set S ⊆ Rk, we abuse
notation and define γ(S) = {γ(x) | x ∈ S}. Moreover, given S ∈ 2Rk ×R≥0, we define
γ(S) = {(γ(X), t) | (X , t) ∈ S}.
2.1 Agent mode dynamics
In this section, we define the syntax and semantics of the model that determines the
dynamics of an agent. We present the syntax first.
Definition 1 (syntax). The agent dynamics are defined by a tuple A = 〈S,P, f 〉, where
S ⊆ Rn is its state space, P ⊆ Rm is its parameter or mode space, and the dynamic
function f : S×P→ S that is Lipschitz in the first argument.
The semantics of an agent dynamics is defined by trajectories, which describe the
evolution of states over time.
Definition 2 (semantics). For a given agent A= 〈S,P, f 〉, we call a function ξ : S×P×
R≥0→ S a trajectory if ξ is differentiable in its third argument, and given an initial state
x0 ∈ S and a mode p ∈ P, ξ (x0, p,0) = x0 and for all t > 0,
dξ
dt
(x0, p, t) = f (ξ (x0, p, t), p). (1)
We say that ξ (x0, p, t) is the state of A at time t when it starts from x0 in mode p.
Given an initial state x0 ∈ S and mode p ∈ P, the trajectory ξ (x0, p, ·) is the unique
solution of the ordinary differential equation (ODE) (1) since f is Lipschitz continuous.
Given a compact initial set K ⊆ S, a parameter p ∈ P, the set of reachable states of
A over a time interval [ftime,etime] is defined as
Reach(K, p, [ftime,etime]) = {x ∈ S | ∃x0 ∈ K, t ∈ [ftime,etime],x = ξ (x0, p, t)}. (2)
We let Reach(K, p, t) denote the set of reachable states at time t. With unbounded time
intervals, the set is denoted by Reach(K, p, [ftime,∞)).
The bounded time safety verification problem is to check if any state reachable by A
for a given p ∈ P within the time bound is unsafe. That is, given a time bound T > 0,
p ∈ P, and an unsafe set U ⊆ S, we want to check whether
Reach(K, p, [0,T ])∩U = /0
If the unsafe set is time dependent, i.e., U ⊆ S×R≥0, then we need to use Reach(K, p, t)
instead of Reach(K, p, [0,T ]) for checking safety.
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2.2 Reachtubes
Computing reachsets exactly is theoretically hard [21]. There are many reachability anal-
ysis tools [8,1,3] that can compute bounded-time over-approximations of the reachsets.
Generally, given an initial set K for a set of ODEs, these tools can return a sequence of
sets that contain the exact reachset over small time intervals. Motived by this, we define
reachtubes as over-approximations of exact reachsets:
Definition 3. For a given agent A = 〈S,P, f 〉, an initial set K ⊆ T , a mode p ∈ P, and
a time interval [ftime,etime], a (K, p, [ftime,etime])-reachtube ReachTb(K, p, [0,T ]) is
a sequence {(Xi, [τi−1,τi])} ji=1 such that Reach(K, p, [τi−1,τi])⊆ Xi, and τ0 = ftime<
τ1 < · · ·< τ j = etime. Without loss of generality, we assume equal separation between
the time points, i.e. ∃ τs > 0,∀i ∈ [ j],τi− τi−1 = τs.
For a given (K, p, [ftime,etime])-reachtube rtube, we denote its parameters by rtube.K,
rtube.p, rtube.ftime, and rtube.etime, respectively, and its cardinality by rtube.len.
We define union, truncation, concatenate, and time-shift operators on reachtubes.
Fix rtube1 = {(Xi,1, [τi−1,1,τi,1])} j1i=1 and rtube2 = {(Xi,2, [τi−1,2,τi,2])} j2i=1 to be two
reachtubes, where j1 = rtube1.len and j2 = rtube2.len. Assume that τi,1 = τi,2 for all
i ∈ min( j1, j2), we say they are time-aligned. Without loss of generality, assume that
j1 ≤ j2. The operators are defined as follows:
– union: rtube1∪ rtube2 = {(Xi,1∪Xi,2, [τi−1,1,τi,1)]} j1i=1∪{Xi,2} j2i= j1+1.
– timeShift(rtube1, ts) = {(Xi,1, [ts+ τi−1,1, ts+ τi,1])} j1i=1.
– concatenation: rtube1 _ rtube2 = {rtube1∪ timeShift(rtube2,τ j1,1)}.
– truncate(rtube1, tc) = {(Xi,1, [τi−1,1,τi,1])}ki=1, where τk,1 ≥ tc and τk−1,1 < tc.
A simulation of system (1) is an approximate reachtube with X0 being a singleton
state x0 ∈ K. That is, a simulation is a representation of ξ (x0, p, ·). Several numerical
solvers can compute such simulations as VNODE-LP1 and CAPD Dyn-Sys library 2.
Example 1 (Fixed-wing aircraft following a single waypoint). Consider an agent with
state space S = R4, parameter space P = R4, and f : S×P→ S defined as follows: for
any x ∈ S and p ∈ P,
f (x, p) = [
Tc− cd1x[0]2
m
,
g
x[0]
sinφ ,x[0]cosx[1],x[0]sinx[1]],
where Tc = k1m(vc−x[0]), φ = k2 vcg (ψc−x[1]),ψc = arctan( x[2]−p[2]x[3]−p[3] ), and k1,k2,m,g,cd1,
and vc are positive constants. The agent models a fixed-wing aircraft starting from a
waypoint and following another in the 2D plane: x[0] is its speed, x[1] is its heading
angle, (x[2],x[3]) is its position in the plane, [p(0), p(1)] is the position of the source
waypoint, and (p[2], p[3]) is the position of the destination one. Note that the source
waypoint does not affect the dynamics, but will be useful later in the paper.
1 http://www.cas.mcmaster.ca/~nedialk/vnodelp/
2 http://capd.sourceforge.net/capdDynSys/docs/html/odes_rigorous.html
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3 Symmetry and Equivariant Dynamical Systems
Symmetry plays a fundamental rule in the analysis of dynamical and control systems. It
has been used for studying stability of feedback systems[24], designing observers [5]
and controllers [27], and analyzing neural networks [20]. In this section, we present
definitions for symmetry transforms and their implications on systems that posses them.
3.1 Symmetry of systems with inputs
In the following, symmetry transformations are defined by the ability of computing new
solutions of (1) using already computed ones. First, let Γ be a group of smooth maps
acting on S.
Definition 4 (Definition 2 in [25]). We say that γ ∈ Γ is a symmetry of (1) if for any
solution ξ (x0, p, ·), γ(ξ (x0, p, ·)) is also a solution.
Using γ-symmetry, we can get a new trajectory without simulating the system but
instead by just transforming the entire old trajectory using γ(·).
For a linear dynamical system x˙ = Ax, it is easy to see that any matrix B that
commutes with A is a symmetry for the system. Consider the dynamics of an agent
to be f (x, p) = Ax. We can write down the closed-form solution of the trajectories to
be ξ (x0, p, t) = x0eAt . If γ(x) = Bx,∀x ∈ S and AB = BA, then ξ (Bx0, p, t) = Bx0eAt =
Bξ (x0, p, t). Therefore, B is a symmetry for the system if AB = BA.
In the following definition we characterize the conditions under which a transforma-
tion is a symmetry of (1).
Definition 5. The dynamic function f : S×P→ S is said to be Γ -equivariant if for any
γ ∈ Γ , there exists ρ : P→ P such that for all x ∈ S, ∂γ∂x f (x, p) = f (γ(x),ργ(p)).
The following theorem shows that it is enough to check the condition in Definition 5
to prove that a transformation is a symmetry of (1).
Theorem 1 (part of Theorem 10 in [25]). If f is Γ -equivariant, then for any γ ∈ Γ , if
ξ (x0, p, ·) is a solution of (1), then so is γ(ξ (x0, p, ·)), which is equal to ξ (γ(x0),ργ(p), ·),
where ρ is the transformation associated with γ according to Definition 5.
Proof. Let y = γ(x), then y˙ = ∂γ∂x (x˙) =
∂γ
∂x ( f (x, p)) = f (γ(x),ρ(p)) = f (y,ρ(p)). The
second equality is a result of the derivative chain rule. The 3rd equality uses Definition 5.
Remark 1. Note that if γ in Theorem 1 is linear, the condition in Definition 5 for a map
γ to be a symmetry becomes γ( f (x, p)) = f (γ(x),ρ(p)).
Note that the commutativity condition with the vector field of the ODE in Definition 5
is similar to the properties of Lyapanov functions in the sense that it proves a property
about the solutions without inspecting them individually.
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Example 2 (Fixed-wing aircraft coordinate transformation symmetry). Consider the
fixed-wing aircraft model presented in Section 2.1. Fix goal ∈ R2 and θ ∈ R. Let
γ : R4→ R4 and ρ : R4→ R4 be defined as:
γ(x) = [x[0],x[1]+θ ,(x[2]−goal[0])cos(θ)+(x[3]−goal[1])sin(θ),
− (x[2]−goal[0])sin(θ)+(x[3]−goal[1])cos(θ)] and (3)
ρ(p) = [0,0,(p[2]−goal[0])cos(θ)+(p[2]−goal[1])sin(θ),
− (p[3]−goal[0])sin(θ)+(p[3]−goal[1])cos(θ)]. (4)
Then, for all x ∈ S and p ∈ P, γ( f (x, p)) = f (γ(x),ρ(p)), where f is as in Section 2.1.
The transformation γ would change the origin of the state space from [0,0,0,0] to
[0,0,goal[0],goal[1]]. Then, it would rotate the third and four axes counter-clockwise by
θ . Moreover, ρ would set the first two coordinates of the parameters to zero as they do not
affect the dynamics, translate the origin of the parameter space to [0,0,goal[0],goal[1]],
and rotate the third and fourth axes counter-clockwise by θ . For the aircraft, this means
translating and rotating the plane where the aircraft and the waypoint positions reside.
3.2 Symmetry and reachtubes
Computing reachtubes is computationally expensive. For example, one of the approaches
for such computation entails simulating the system using an ODE solver, solving non-
trivial optimization problems numerically to compute sensitivity functions, and comput-
ing the Minkowski sum of the solution with the sensitivity function [13,15,16]. Another
approach entails Taylor approximations of the dynamics, integrations, and optimizations
of the time discretization of the solution [8,6]. It would also require several such compu-
tations to get tight enough reachtubes [13,6]. All of the these approaches face the curse
of dimensionality: their complexity grows exponentially with respect to the dimension
of the system. Compared with that, transforming reachtubes is much cheaper, especially
if the transformation is linear. For example, assume the tube rtube is represented using
polytopes, i.e. for any pair (X , [τi−1,τi]) in rtube, X is a polytope in Rn. Linearly trans-
forming rtube would require rtube.len matrix multiplications. Hence, it would require
polynomial time in n.
In our previous work [26], we showed how to get reachtubes of autonomous systems
from previously computed ones using symmetry transformations. In this paper, we show
how to do that for systems with parameters. This allows different modes of a hybrid
system and different agents with similar dynamics to share reachtube computations. That
was not possible when the theory was limited to autonomous systems.
Theorem 2. If (1) is Γ -equivariant according to Definition 5, then for any γ ∈ Γ and its
corresponding ρ , any K, p, [ftime,etime] and {(Xi, [τi−1,τi])} ji=1 as a (K, p, [ftime,etime])-
reachtube,
∀i ∈ [ j],Reach(γ(K),ρ(p), [τi−1,τi]) = γ(Reach(K, p, [τi−1,τi]))⊆ γ(Xi).
Proof. (Sketch) The first part Reach(γ(K),ρ(p), [τi−1,τi]) = γ(Reach(K, p, [τi−1,τi]))
follows directly from Theorem 1. The second part γ(Reach(K, p, [τi−1,τi])) ⊆ γ(Xi)
Multi-Agent Safety Verification using Symmetry Transformations 7
follows from the reachtube ReachTb(K, p, [ftime,etime]) is an over-approximation of
the exact reachset during the small time intervals [τi−1,τi].
Theorem 2 says that we can transform a computed reachtube ReachTb(K, p, [t1, t2]) =
{(Xi, [τi−1,τi])} ji=1 to get another reachtube {(γ(Xi), [τi−1,τi])} ji=1, which is an over-
approximation of the reachsets starting from γ(K).
Moreover, we present a corollary that is essential for using symmetry in the safety
verification and synthesis algorithms of (1).
Corollary 1. Fix rtube= ReachTb(K, p, [ftime,etime])= {Xi, [τi−1,τi]} ji=1 and rtube′=
ReachTb(K′, p′, [ftime,etime]) = {X ′i , [τi−1,τi]} ji=1, where j = rtube.len. If (1) is Γ -
equivariant, and K′ ⊆ Rn, then if there exists γ ∈ Γ and corresponding ρ such that
K′ ⊆ γ(K) and p′ = ρ(p), then ∀i ∈ [ j],X ′i ⊆ γ(Xi).
The corollary says that the transformation of the reachtube starting from K with mode p
is an overapproximation of the one starting from K′ with mode p′ if γ(K) contains K′.
The results of this section subsume the results about transforming reachtubes of
dynamical systems without parameters presented in [26].
4 Virtual system
The challenge in safety verification of multi-agent systems is that the dimensionality
of the problem grows too rapidly with the number of agents to be handled by any of
the current approaches. However, often agents share the same dynamics. For instance,
several drones of the type described in Example 1 share the same dynamics but they may
have different initial conditions and follow different waypoints. This commonality has
been exploited in developing specialized proof techniques [22]. For reachability analysis,
using symmetry transforms of the previous section, reachtubes of one agent in one mode
can be used to get the reachtubes of other modes and even other agents.
Fix a particular value pv ∈ P and call it the virtual parameter. Assume that for all
p∈ P, there exists a pair of transformations (γp,ρp) such that ρp(p) = pv, γp is invertible,
and γp( f (x, p)) = f (γp(x),ρp(pv)) = f (γp(x), pv). Consider the resulting ODE:
dξ
dt
(y, pv, t) = f (ξ (y, pv, t), pv). (5)
Following [25], we call (5) a virtual system. Correspondingly, we call (1), the real system
for the rest of the paper. The virtual system unifies the behavior of all modes of the real
system in one representative mode, the virtual one.
Example 3 (Fixed-wing aircraft virtual system). Consider the fixed-wing aircraft agent
described in Example 1 and the corresponding transformation described in Example 2.
Fix p ∈ P, we set goal in the transformation of Example 2 to [p[2], p[3]] and θ to
arctan2(p[0]− p[2], p[3]− p[1]) and let γp and ρp be the resulting transformations. Then,
for all p ∈ P, ρp(p) = [0,0,0,0]. Hence, pv = [0,0,0,0] and the virtual system is that of
Example 1 with the parameter p= pv. For the aircraft, this means that γp would translate
the origin of the plane to the destination waypoint and rotate its axes so that the y-axis is
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aligned with the segment between the source and destination waypoints. Hence, in the
constructed virtual system, the destination waypoint is the origin of the plane and the
source waypoint is some-point along the y-axis although we fix it to the origin as well as
it does not affect the dynamics.
The solutions of the virtual system can be transformed to get solutions of all other
modes in P using {γ−1p }p∈P using Theorem 1.
Theorem 3. Given any initial state y0 ∈ S, and any mode p∈P and its corresponding γp
that maps it to the virtual system (5), γ−1p (ξ (y0, pv, ·)) is a solution of the real system (1)
with mode p starting from γ−1p (y0).
Proof. Lets start with the first part of the theorem. Fix p ∈ P and let x0 = γ−1p (y0).
Using Theorem 1, γp(ξ (x0, p, ·)) = ξ (γp(x0),ρp(p), ·)) and is the solution of the real
system (1). Furthermore, ρp(p) = pv by definition and γp(x0) = γp(γ−1p (y0)) = y0.
Hence, γp(ξ (x0, p, ·)) = ξ (y0, pv, ·). Applying γ−1p on both sides implies the first part of
the theorem.
The following corollary extends the result of Theorem 3 to reachtubes. It follows
from Theorem 2.
Corollary 2. Given any initial set Kv ∈ S, and any mode p∈P, γ−1p (ReachTb(Kv, pv, [tb, te]))
is a reachtube of the real system (1) with mode p starting from γ−1p (Kv).
Consequently, we get a solution or a reachtube for each mode p ∈ P of the real
system by simply transforming a single solution or a single reachtube of the virtual
system using the inverses of the transformations {γp}p∈P. This will be the essential
idea behind the savings in computation time of the new symmetry-based reachtube
computation algorithm and symmetry-based safety verification algorithm presented
next. It will be also the essential idea behind proving safety with unbounded time and
unbounded number of modes.
Example 4 (Fixed-wing aircraft infinite number of reachtubes resulting from transform-
ing a single one). Consider the real system in Example 1 and the virtual one in Example 3.
Fix the initial set Kr = [[1, pi4 ,3,1], [2,
pi
3 ,4,2]], pr = [2.5,0.5,13.3,5], and the time bound
20 seconds. Then, using Example 3, θ = arctan2(2.5−13.3,5−0.5) =−1.176 rad and
goal= [13.3,5]. We call the corresponding transformation γpr . Let Kv = γpr(Kr). Remem-
ber that pv = [0,0,0,0]. Assume that we have the reachtube rtuber = ReachTb(Kr, pr,T ).
Then, using Corollary 2, we can get rtubev = ReachTb(Kv, pv,T ) by transforming rtuber
using γpr . The benefit of the corollary appears in the following: for any p ∈ P = R4, we
can get ReachTb(γ−1p (Kv), p,T ) by transforming rtubev using γ−1p .
The projection of Kv on its last two coordinates Kv ↓[2:3] that represent the possible
initial position of the aircraft in the plane would be a rotated square with angle θ . The
distance from Kv ↓[2:3] center to the origin would be equal to the distance from K ↓[2:3]
center to the destination waypoint. Moreover, the angle between the y-axis and the center
of Kv ↓[2:3] would be equal to the angle from the segment connecting the source and
destination waypoints to the center of K ↓[2:3]. On the other hand, Kv ↓[1]= K ↓[1] and
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Kv ↓[2]= K ↓[2] +θ . Now, consider any two waypoints, if the initial set of the aircraft
relative position to the segment connecting the waypoints is the same as K, it is smaller
or equal to K, and the time bound is less than or equal to T , we can get the corresponding
reachtube by transforming rtubev to the coordinate system defined by the new segment.
In summary, the absolute positions of the aircraft and waypoints do not matter. What
matters is their relative positions. The virtual system stores what matters and whenever a
reachtube is needed for a new absolute position, it can be transformed from the virtual
one.
5 Symmetry-based verification algorithm
In this section, we introduce a novel safety verification algorithm, symSafetyVerif,
which uses existing reachability subroutines, but exploits symmetry. Unlike existing
algorithms which compute the reachtubes of multi-agent systems from scratch for each
agent and each mode, symSafetyVerif reuses the reachtubes computed from the virtual
system. As we have discussed, transforming reachtubes is more efficient than computing
reachtubes. Therefore, symSafetyVerif can speed up verification while preserving the
soundness and precision of the reachability subroutines. In our earlier work [26], we
introduced reachtube transformations using symmetry reduction for dynamical systems
(single mode). Here, we extend the method across modes and we introduce the use of
the virtual system, and we develop the corresponding verification algorithm.
In Section 5.1, we define tubecache—a data-structure for storing reachtubes; in 5.2,
we present the symmetry-based reachtube computation algorithm symComputeReachtube
that resuses reachtubes stored in tubecache; finally, in 5.3, we define the safetycache
data-structure which stores previously computed safety verification results which are
used by the symSafetyVerif algorithm.
5.1 tubecache: shared memory for reachtubes
We show how we use the virtual system (5) to create a shared memory for the different
modes of the real system (1) to reuse each others’ computed reachtubes. We call this
shared memory tubecache. It stores reachtubes, as the over-approximation of reachsets,
of the virtual system (5). Later on, when dealing with the reachtube of the real systems,
we will only need to transform the reachtubes in tubecache instead of computing the
reachtubes again.
Definition 6. A tubecache is a data structure that stores a set of reachtubes of the virtual
system (5). It has two methods: getTube, for retrieving stored tubes and storeTube,
for storing a newly computed one.
Given an initial set K, we want to avoid computing the reachtube for it for as
large portion of K as possible. Therefore, getTube would return a list of reachtubes
ReachTb(Ki, pv, [0,Ti]), i ∈ [k], for some k ∈ N that are already stored in tubecache.
Moreover, the union of Kis is the largest subset of K that can be covered by the initial
sets of the reachtubes in tubecache. Formally,
tubecache.getTube(K) = argmax{ReachTb(Ki,pv,[0,Ti])∈tubecache}iVol(K∩∪iKi), (6)
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where Vol(·) is the Lebesgue measure of the set. Note that for any K ⊂ Rn, a maximizer
of (6) would be the set of all reachtubes in tubecache. However, this is very inefficient
and the union of all reachtubes in tubecache would be too conservative to be useful for
checking safety. Therefore, getTube should return the minimum number of reachtubes
that maximize (6).
Note that the reachtubes in tubecache may have different time bounds. We will
truncate or extend them when needed.
5.2 symComputeReachtube: symmetry-based reachtube computation
Given an initial set K ⊂ S, a mode p ∈ P, and time bound T > 0, there are dozen of
tools that tools that can return a ReachTb(K, p, [0,T ]). See [13,8,9] for examples of such
tools. We denote this procedure by computeReachtube(K, p, [0,T ]).
Instead of calling computeReachtube(·) whenever we need a reachtube, we want to
use symmetry to reduce the load of computing new reachtubes by retrieving reachtubes
that are already stored in tubecache. We introduce Algorithm 1 which implements this
idea and denote it by symComputeReachtube. We map the initial set K to an initial set
Kv using γp, i.e. Kv = γp(K), where we use the subscript v for “virtual”. Then, we map
the resulting reachtube from the call using γ−1p .
The input of symComputeReachtube consists of Kv and T , and the tubecache that
stores already computed reachtubes of the virtual system (5).
First, it initializes restubev as an empty tube of the virtual system (5) to store the
result in line 2. It then gets the reachtubes from tubecache that corresponds to Kv using
the getTube method in line 3. Now that it has the relevant tubes storedtubes, it adjusts
their lengths based on the time bound T . For a retrieved tube with a time bound less
than T in line 5, symComputeReachtube extends the tube for the remaining time using
computeReachtube in lines 6-7, store the resulting tube in tubecache instead of the
shorter one in line 8. If the retrieved tube is longer than T (line 9), it trims it in line 10.
However, we keep the long one in the tubecache to not lose a computation we already
did. Then, the tube with the adjusted length is added to the result tube restubev in line 11.
The union of the initial sets of the tubes retrieved storedtubes may not contain all of
the initial set Kv. That uncovered part is called K′v in line 12. The reachtube starting from
K′v would be computed from scratch using computeReachtube in line 13, stored in
tubecache in line 14, and added to restubev in line 15. The resulting tube of the virtual
system (5) is returned in line 16. This tube would be transformed by the calling algorithm
using γ−1p to get the corresponding tube of the real system (1).
Theorem 4. The output of Algorithm 1 is an over-approximation of the reachtube
ReachTb(Kv, pv, [0,T ]).
Proof. computeReachtube always return over-approximations of the reachset from
a given initial set and time bound, and restubev contains reachtubes that have been
computed by computeReachtube at some point. There are three types of reachtubes in
restubev:
1. When the time bound Ti of the stored reachtube storedtubes[i] is less than T , we
need to extend storedtubes[i] until time T by concatenating the original tube with the
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Algorithm 1 symComputeReachtube
1: input: Kv,T, tubecache
2: restubev← /0
3: storedtubes← tubecache.getTube(Kv)
4: for i ∈ [|storedtubes|] do
5: if storedtubes[i].T < T then
6: (Ki, [τi−1,Ti])← storedtubes[i].end
7: tubei← storedtubes[i]_ computeReachtube(Ki, pv, [0,T −Ti])
8: tubecache.storeTube(tubei)
9: else if storedtubes[i].T > T then
10: tubei← storedtubes[i].truncate(T )
11: restubev← restubev∪ tubei
12: K′v← Kv\∪i storedtubes[i].K
13: tube′ = computeReachtube(K′v, pv, [0,T ])
14: tubecache.storeTube(tube′)
15: restubev← restubev∪ tube′
16: return: restubev
result of the call computeReachtube(Ki, pv, [0,T −Ti]) where [Ki, [τi−1,Ti] is the
last pair in storedtubes[i]. It is easy to check that the concatenated two reachtubes is
a valid (storedtubes[i].K, pv, [0,T ])- reachtube.
2. When the time bound Ti of the stored reachtube storedtubes[i] is more than T , the
truncated reachtube is also a valid (storedtubes[i].K, pv, [0,T ])- reachtube.
3. For K′v that is not contained in the union of the initial sets in storedtubes, computeReachtube
will return a valid (K′v, pv, [0,T ])- reachtube. Finally, the union of reachtubes is a
reachtube of the union of the initial sets.
The union of the initial sets of the tubes in storedtubes and K′v contains Kv, so the union
of the reachtubes the algorithm returns a (Kv, pv, [0,T ])- reachtube.
The importance of symComputeReachtube lies in that if a mode p required a
computation of a reachtube and the result is saved in tubecache, another mode with
a similar scenario with respect to the virtual system would reuse that tube instead of
computing one from scratch. Moreover, reachtubes of the same mode might be reused as
well if the scenario was repeated again.
5.3 Bounded time safety
In this section, we show how to use tubecache and symComputeReachtube of the previ-
ous section for bounded and unbounded time safety verification of the real system (1). We
consider a scenario where the safety verification of multiple modes of the real system (1)
starting from different initial sets and for different time horizons is needed. We will
use the virtual system (5) and the transformations {γp}p∈P to share safety computations
across modes, initial sets, time horizons, and unsafe sets.
We first introduce safetycache, a shared memory to store the results of intersecting
reachtubes of the virtual system (5) with different unsafe sets. It will prevent repeating
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safety checking computations by different modes under similar scenarios. It will also
play the key role to deduce unbounded time safety properties of the real system (1) later
in the section.
Definition 7. A safetycache is a data structure that stores the results of intersecting
reachtubes of the virtual system (5) with unsafe sets. It has two functions: getIntersect,
for retrieving stored results and storeIntersect, for storing a newly computed one.
Given an initial set Kv, a time bound T , and an unsafe set Uv, the reachtube
ReachTb(Kv, pv, [0,T ]) is going to be unsafe if another reachtubes ReachTb(K′v, pv, [0,T ′])
which is already stored in tubecache is unsafe, and ReachTb(K′v, pv, [0,T ′]) is an under-
approximation of ReachTb(Kv, pv, [0,T ]). Similarly, if ReachTb(K′v, pv, [0,T ′]) is an
over-approximation of ReachTb(Kv, pv, [0,T ]) and is safe, then ReachTb(Kv, pv, [0,T ])
is safe. Formally, the getIntersect function of safetycache returns the truth value of
the predicate ReachTb(Kv, pv, [0,T ])∩Uv 6= /0 if a subsuming computation is stored, and
returns ⊥, otherwise.
Formally, safetycache.getIntersect(Kv,T,Uv) =
0, if ∃K′v,T ′,U ′v | Kv ⊇ K′v,T ≥ T ′,Uv ⊇U ′v,(K′v,T ′,U ′v) ∈ safetycache,rtube∩Uv 6= /0,
1, if ∃K′v,T ′,U ′v | Kv ⊆ K′v,T ≤ T ′,Uv ⊆U ′v,(K′v,T ′,U ′v) ∈ safetycache,rtube∩Uv = /0,
⊥, otherwise,
(7)
where rtube= ReachTb(K′v, pv, [0,T ′]), 0 means unsafe, 1 means safe, and⊥ means not
stored.
It is equivalent to check the intersection of a reachtube of the real system (1) with an
unsafe set U and to check the intersection of the corresponding mapped reachtube and
unsafe set of the virtual one. This is formalized in the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Consider an unsafe set U ⊆ Rn×R+ and an over-approximated reachtube
rtube = ReachTb(K, p, [t1, t2]). Then, for any invertible γ : Rn→ Rn, rtube∩U 6= /0 if
and only if γ(rtube)∩ γ(U) 6= /0.
Now that we have established the equivalence of safety checking between the real
and virtual systems, we present Algorithm 2 denoted by symSafetyVerif. It uses
safetycache, tubecache, and symComputeReachtube in order to share safety verifica-
tion computations across modes. The method symSafetyVerif would be called several
times to check safety of different scenarios and safetycache and tubecache would be
maintained across calls.
symSafetyVerif takes as input an initial set K, a mode p, a time bound T , an
unsafe set U , the transformation γp, and safetycache and tubecache that resulted from
previous runs of the algorithm.
It starts by transforming the initial and unsafe sets K and U to a virtual system
initial and unsafe sets Kv and Uv using γp in line 2. It then checks if a subsuming
result of the safety check for the tuple (Kv,T,Uv) exists in safetycache using its method
getIntersect in line 3. If it does exist, it returns it directly in line 8. Otherwise,
the approximate reachtube is computed using symComputeReachtube in line 5. The
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returned tube is intersected with Uv in line 6 and the result of the intersection is stored in
safetycache in line 7. It is returned in line 8.
Algorithm 2 symSafetyVerif
1: input: K, p,T,U,γp,safetycache, tubecache
2: Kv← γp(K), Uv← γp(U)
3: result← safetycache.getIntersect(Kv,T,Uv)
4: if result =⊥ then
5: rtube← symComputeReachtube (Kv,T, tubecache)
6: result← (tube∩Uv = /0)
7: safetycache.storeIntersect(Kv,T,Uv,result)
8: return: result
The following theorem show symSafetyVerif is able to prove safety.
Theorem 5. If symSafetyVerif returns safe, then ReachTb(K, p, [0,T ])∩U = /0.
Proof. From Theorem 4, if the result is not stored in safetycache, we know from The-
orem 4 that rtube in line 5 is an over-approximation of ReachTb(Kv, pv, [0,T ]). More-
over, we know from Corollary 2 that ReachTb(K, p, [0,T ]) ⊆ γ−1p (rtube). But, from
Lemma 1, we know that the truth value of the predicate (rtube∩Uv = /0) is equal to that
of (γ−1p (rtube)∩U = /0) and hence result is safe if γ−1p (rtube)∩U = /0 and thus it is safe
if ReachTb(K, p,T )∩U = /0. Finally, the stored values in safetycache are results from
previous runs, and hence have the same property.
However, if symSafetyVerif returns unsafe, it might be that rtube in line 5 inter-
sected the unsafe set because of an over-approximation error. There are two sources
of such errors: the computeReachtube method used by symComputeReachtube can
itself result in over-approximation errors and actually it will most of the time [13,8]. But
it may be exact too [3]. The other source of errors is the tubecache.getTube method
which would return list of tubes with the union of their initial sets containing states that
do not belong to the asked initial set. The first problem can be solved by: asking the
method computeReachtube to compute tighter reachtubes as existing methods provide
this option at the expense of more computation [13,8]. We can use symmetry in these
tightening computations as well, as we did in [26]. We can also replace saved tubes
in tubecache with newly computed tighter ones. The second problem can be solved
by asking tubecache.getTube to return only the tubes with initial sets that are fully
contained in the asked initial set. This would decrease the savings from transforming
cached results, but it would reduce the false-positive error, saying unsafe while it is safe.
5.4 Unbounded time safety
In this section, we show how can we deduce unbounded safety checks results from finite
ones. The following corollary applies Lemma 1 to the transformations {γp}p∈P that map
the different modes of the real system (1) to the unique virtual one (5).
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Corollary 3 (Infinite safety verification results from a single one). Fix U ⊆ Rn and
rtube = ReachTb(Kv, pv, [0,T ]). If rtube∩U = /0, then for all p ∈ P, γ−1p (rtube)∩
γ−1p (U) = /0.
The corollary means that from a single reachtube ReachTb(K, pv, [0,T ]) and unsafe
set U intersection operation, we can deduce the safety of any mode p starting from
γ−1p (K) and running for T time units with respect to γ−1p (U). This would for example
imply unbounded time safety of a hybrid automaton under the assumption that the unsafe
sets of the modes are at the same relative position with respect to the reachtube. But,
safetycache stores a number of results of such operations. We can infer from each one of
them the safety of infinite scenarios in every mode. This is formalized in the following
theorem which follows directly from Corollary 3.
Theorem 6 (Infinite safety verification results from finite ones). For any mode p∈P,
initial set K ⊆ S, time bound T ≥ 0, and unsafe set U ⊂ S×R≥0, such that K ⊆ γ−1p (K′),
U ⊆ γ−1p (U ′), and safetycache(K′,T,U ′) = 1, system (1) is safe.
As more saved results are added to safetycache, we can deduce the safety of more
scenarios in all modes. If at a given point of time, we are sure that no new scenarios
would appear, we can deduce the safety for unbounded time and unbounded number of
agents with the same dynamics having scenarios already covered.
Example 5 (Fixed-wing aircraft infinite number of safety verification results from com-
puting a single one). Consider the initial set K, mode p, time bound T , and their
corresponding virtual ones Kv and pv considered in Example 4. Let the unsafe set
be U = [[0,−∞,11.9,5.1], [∞,∞,12.9,6.1]]×R≥0 and Uv = γpr(U), where γpr is as de-
scribed in Example 4. Assume that rtubev∩Uv = /0 and the result is stored in safetycache.
Then, for all p ∈ P, γ−1p (rtubev)∩ γ−1p (Uv) = /0.
For the aircraft, U could represent a building. Crashing with the building at any speed,
heading angle, and time is unsafe. Uv represents the relative position of the building with
respect to the segment of waypoints. Theorem 6 says that for any initial set of states K
of the aircraft and time bound T , if the relative positions of the aircraft, unsafe set, and
the segment of waypoints are the same or subsumed by those of Kv, Uv, and the origin,
we can infer safety irrespective of their absolute positions.
Example 6 (Fixed-wing aircraft unbounded time safety). Consider a sequence of modes
p0 = [0,0,10,0], p1 = [10,0,10,10], p3 = [10,10,0,10], p4 = [0,10,0,20], p5 = [0,20,20,20], p6 =
[20,20,20,30] . . . in P which draw a vertical concatenations of S shaped paths with seg-
ments of size 10. Assume that the aircraft in Example 1 switches between different modes
once its position [x[2],x[3]] is in the square with side equal to 1 around the destination
waypoint [pi[2], pi[3]], the absolute value of the angle with the segment is at most pi6 , and
its speed within 0.5 of vc. We call this the guard(pi). Moreover, we assume that for each
waypoint, there exists a corresponding unsafe set Upi = [[0,−∞,b1,b2], [∞,∞,u1,u2]],
where the square [[b1,b2], [u1,u2]] has radius 1 and center 2 units to the left of the center
of the segment of pi. One would verify the safety of such a system by computing the
reachtube rtubepi of a mode pi and checking if it is safe by intersecting with Upi . If it
is safe, we compute the intersection of rtubepi with guard(pi) to get the initial set for
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pi+1, and repeat the process again. However, we know that the initial set of any mode
pi is at most guard(pi) which we know its relative position with respect to the segment.
Moreover, we know the position of the unsafe set with respect to the segment. Then, one
can deduce the unbounded-time safety of this system by just checking the safety of one
segment as all scenarios are the same in the virtual system.
6 Experimental evaluation
We implemented a safety verification software tool for multi-agent hybrid systems based
on symComputeReachtube using Python 3. We call it CacheReach. We tested it on a
linear dynamical system and the aircraft model of Example 1 using DryVR [18] and
Flow* [8] as reachability subroutines.
The section is organized as follows: we describe the multi-agent verification algo-
rithm symMultiVerif that we designed and implemented in CacheReach in Section 6.1,
describe the symComputeReachtube implementation in Section 6.2, and finish with the
results of the experiments and corresponding analysis in Section 6.3.
6.1 CacheReach and symMultiVerif: multi-agent safety verification algorithm
The pseudo code for the multi-agent verification algorithm symMultiVerif that we im-
plement in CacheReach is shown in Algorithm 3. Our tool CacheReach takes as input
a JSON file specifying a list of N agents of dimension n in line 1. It also specifies the
python file that contains the dynamics function f of Definition 1 and the symmetry trans-
formation function. The transformation γ would be equal to the map γp that transform
solutions of the real system (1) to those of the virtual one (5), given a mode p ∈ P. The
list of modes that the ith agent transition between sequentially and their corresponding
guards is specified as well and denoted by Hi in line 1. The guard of the jth mode Hi[ j].p
of the ith agent Hi[ j].guard is a predicate on the agent state which when satisfied, the
agent transition mode to the ( j+1)st mode. The guard Hi[ j] has time bound Hi[ j].T on
how long the agent can stay in that mode. Moreover, for each agent i ∈ [N], it specifies
the initial set of states Ki. Finally, it specifies the static unsafe set U and the subset
O⊆ [n] that is relevant for dynamic safety checking between agents. If the reachtubes of
two agents projected on O intersect each other, it would model a collision between the
agents. For example, O would be {2,3} for the aircraft model in Example 1 as (x[2],x[3])
represents its position.
CacheReach would return unsafe if the reachtubes of the agents starting from their
initial sets of states and following the sequence of modes intersect static unsafe set in
line 10, or when projected to O, intersect each other in line 16. It would return safe in
line 18, otherwise.
Currently, CacheReach assumes that all agents share the same dynamics but do not
interact. Hence, it has a single tubecache that is shared by all (line 2). Current nonlinear
hybrid-system verification tools such as C2E2 [13] or Flow* [8] would consider the
combination of the agents as a single system. The dimension of this system would be
n×N. It would have a parameter of size equal to N times the size of the parameter
vector of a single agent. This parameter would change values whenever an agent in the
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system switches modes. The unsafe set of such a system would be the static unsafe sets
specified in the input JSON file and the dynamic unsafe set would be the safety relevant
dimensions of a pair of agents being equal at the same time which detects a collision.
This unsafe set would be time annotated. Such verification tools would compute the
reachtube of such a system sequentially on a per mode basis. The reachtube of the mode
would be intersected with the guard to get the initial set of the next mode. Another
reachtube would be computed starting from the computed initial set. Each of these tubes
is intersected with the unsafe sets to get the verification result.
CacheReach computes the reachtubes of individual agents independently. It would
compute the reachtube mtubei of the jth mode Hi[ j] of the ith agent in lines 6-8 using
symComputeReachtube and intersect it with the guard using a function guardIntersect
to get the initial set initseti for the next mode in line 11. In addition to initseti, guardIntersect
computes the minimum and maximum times: mintimei and maxtimei, respectively, at
which mtubei intersects the guard. The value mintimei is the time at which a trajectory
of the next mode may start at and maxtimei is the maximum such time. These values
will essential time information to check safety against time-annotated unsafe sets. That
is because these values defined the range of time the trajectories starting from the initial
set of the next mode may start at.
The computed tube mtubei gets appended to atubei storing the full reachtube of the
ith agent in line 8. The benefit of this method is that now all modes of all agents can
be mapped to a single virtual system. They can resuse each others reachtubes using
tubecache that is getting updated at every call to symComputeReachtube. Moreover,
the static safety is done in the usual way in line 10. The collision between agents is done
by the function checkDynamicSafety.
The function checkDynamicSafety takes two full reachtubes of two agents atube1
and atube2 along with two arrays lookback1 and lookback2. For agent i, the array
lookbacki consists of pairs of integers (ind j, timerange j) specifying the index iden-
tifying the beginning of the jth mode tube in atubei and the uncertainty in the starting
time of the trajectories its initial set. checkDynamicSafety would use this information
to time-align parts of atube1 and atube2 so that the intersection check happens only
between two sets that may have been reached at the same time by the two agents.
6.2 symComputeReachtube implementation
To implement the tubecache in CacheReach, we grid the state space with a resolution
δ ∈ Rn, where Rn is the state space of an agent. It would be then a dictionary with keys
being centers of the grid cells and values being reachtubes with initial sets being the
corresponding cells.
Given an initial set Kv, symComputeReachtube would compute its bounding box,
quantize its bottom-left and upper-right corners with respect to the grid, iterate over
all cells and check if that cell intersects with Kv. If it does, we check if tubecache
has the corresponding tube and add it to the result. Otherwise, we compute it from
scratch and store it in tubecache with the key being the center of the cell. Then, K′v in
symComputeReachtube would consist of the cells that it did not find the reachtube for
and storedtubes would consists of the reachtubes that we retrieved.
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Algorithm 3 symMultiVerif
1: input: {Ki}Ni=1, {Hi}Ni=1, γ , U , f , O
2: tubecache← /0, agentstubes← /0, lookback← /0
3: for agent i in [N] do
4: initseti← Ki, atubei← /0, lookback[i]← /0
5: for mode index j in [length(Hi)] do
6: Kv,i← γi, j(initseti)
7: mtubev,i← symComputeReachtube(Kv,i,Hi[j].T, tubecache)
8: mtubei← γ−1i, j (mtubev,i)
9: if mtubei∩U then
10: return: unsafe
11: (initseti,mintime,maxtime)← guardIntersect(mtubei,Hi[ j].guard)
12: lookback[i].append((atubei.len,maxtime−mintime))
13: atubei← atubei _ mtubei
14: for agent k in [i−1] do
15: if checkDynamicSafety(atubei, lookback[i],atubek, lookback[k],O) == unsafe then
16: return: unsafe
17: agentstubes[i]← atubei
18: return: safe, agentstubes
6.3 Experimental results
We ran experiments using our tool CacheReach on two models: a 3-dimensional linear
dynamical system example and the nonlinear aircraft model described in Example 1. The
linear model is of the form x˙=A(x− p[3 : 6]), where A= [[−3,1,0], [0,−2,1], [0,0,−1]],
x ∈ R3, and p ∈ R6. We considered scenarios with single, two, and three agents for
each model following different sequences of waypoints. The sequences of waypoints
for the linear model are translations and rotations of an S shaped path. For the aircraft
model, the paths are random crossing paths going north-east. In every scenario, all the
agents have the same model. In the aircraft scenarios, the agent would switch to the
next waypoint once its x, y position is within 0.5 units from the current waypoint in
each dimension. The initial set of the aircraft was of size 1 in the position components,
0.1 in the speed, and 0.01 in the heading angle. We used Flow* [8] and DryVR [18] to
compute reachtubes from scratch for the linear example. We only used DryVR for the
aircraft model since our C++ Flow* wrapper does not handle a model having atan2 in the
dynamics. We ran Algorithm 3 on all scenarios in CacheReach with and without using
tubecache. The symmetry used for the aircraft was the one we showed in Example 3.
For the linear model, the symmetry transformation γp that was used to map the state to
the virtual system was by coordinate transformation where the new origin is at the next
waypoint p[3 : 5] and rotating the xy-plane by the angle between the previous and the
next waypoints p[0 : 2] and p[3 : 5] projected to the plane. We compared the computation
time with and without symmetry and show the results in Table 1. The reachtubes for a
single and three linear agents are shown in Figures 1a and 1b.
In Table 1, we call the combination of symMultiVerif with DryVR while using
tubecache, Sym-DryVR for symmetric DryVR. We call it Sym-Flow* if we are using
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Table 1: Results.
tool \ agent model Linear(1,2,and 3 agents) aircraft(1,2,and 3 agents)
Sym-DryVR
computed 57 90 90 635.23 1181.38 1550.62
transformed 42 165 264 20.76 286.62 501.38
time (min) 0.093 0.163 0.187 3.42 8.2 10.59
Sym-Flow*
computed 39.8 61.14 66.15
transformed 19.2 84.85 143.85 NA NA NA
time (min) 0.387 0.62 0.684
NoSym-DryVR
computed 99 255 354 656 1468 2052
time (min) 0.062 0.355 0.52 3.71 10.78 15.47
NoSym-Flow*
computed 59 151 210
time (min) 0.53 1.328 1.5 NA NA NA
(a) Reachtubes for 3 drones. (b) Reachtubes for 3 linear agents.
Flow* instead. If we are not using tubecache, we call them NoSym-DryVR and NoSym-
Flow*, respectively. Remember in symComputeReachtube, some tubes may be cached
but they have shorter time horizons than the needed tube. So, we compute the rest
from scratch. Here, we report the fractions of tubes computed from scratch and tubes
that were transformed from cached ones. For example, if three quarters of a tube was
cached and the rest was computed, we add 0.75 to the “computed” row and 0.25 to the
“transformed” one. Moreover, we report the execution time till the tubes are computed.
In the experiments, we always compute the full tubes even if it was detected to be
unsafe earlier to have a fair comparison of running times. Moreover, the execution
time does not include dynamic safety checking as the four versions of the tool are
doing the same computations. We are using CacheReach in all scenarios with other
reachability computation tools to decrease the degrees of freedom and show the benefits
of transforming reachtubes over computing them. The Sym versions result in decrease of
running time up-to 2.7 times in the linear case with three agents. The ratio of transformed
vs. computed tubes increases as the number of agents increase. This means that different
agents are sharing reachtubes with each other in the virtual system. The total number of
reachtubes is the same, whether tubecache is used or not. This means that the quality
of the tubes , i.e. how tight they are, is the same whether we are transforming from
tubecache or computing from scratch since the initial sets of modes are computed from
intersections of reachtubes with guards. If the reachtube is coarser, the larger the initial
set would get and the more reachtubes need to be computed.
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6.4 Discussion and conclusions
In this paper, we investigated how symmetry transformations and caching can help
achieve scalable, and possibly unbounded, verification of multi-agent systems. We
developed a notion of virtual system which define symmetry transformations for a broad
class of hybrid and dynamical agent models visiting a waypoint sequences. Using virtual
system, we present a prototype tool called CacheReach that builds a cache of reachtubes
for the transformed virtual system, in a way that is agnostic of the representation of the
reachsets and the reachability analysis subroutine used. Our experimental evaluation
show significant improvement in computation time on simple examples and increased
savings as number of agents increase.
Several research directions are suggested by these results. We aim to develop stronger
static analysis approaches for automatically checking the hypothesis of Theorem 6 which
allows unbounded time safety verification. Applying CacheReach to analyze higher-
dimensional agent models using other reachability subroutines would provide practical
insights about this approach. Finally, exploiting symmetries for synthesis is another
interesting direction.
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